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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers frequently debate difficult issues of legal ethics. However,
they rarely integrate discussions of legal ethics into any broader ethical
theory. Some even deny the logic of any such enterprise. Under such a
view, legal ethics merely serves to promote the interests of some or all
lawyers, as distinguished from those of their clients or the public, without
broader ethical ambition. No group, however, can immunize itself from
broad ethical evaluation. The existence of a professional code of legal
ethics is the beginning, not the end, of the ethical evaluation of lawyers'
conduct
This Article examines the ethical status of some crucial elements of
legal ethics in an unusually broad and systematic way. This examination
illustrates the possibility of genuine progress in understanding and
evaluating legal ethics. In particular, the Article draws upon the ethics of
character in order to transcend otherwise unresolvable conflicts between
those who emphasize the importance of good or bad intentions and those
who emphasize the importance of good or bad consequences.
In the process of carrying out this examination of legal ethics, those
rules of legal ethics that tolerate the abuse of trial witnesses on cross-
examination are called into serious question. The rules of legal ethics that
allow an attorney to question witnesses in a manner intended to mislead
or deceive the jury are also scrutinized. The ultimate aim of this Article,
however, is not simply to criticize particular rules of legal ethics, but to
encourage the criticism or defense of legal ethical rules in a broader,
progressive, systematic way that takes account of disparities in the power
of particular social groups.
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I BASIC PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETmcs
AND BAsIc PROBLEMS N Emics
Let us consider two well-known problems in legal ethics. The first
such problem relates to the cross-examination of a trathful witness in a
manner intended to abuse, intimidate, or destroy that witness' credibility
without casting light on a genuine issue in the case. The second problem
involves a deceptive cross-examination of a witness whom the cross-
examiner knows, through a confidential disclosure, is telling the truth.
Both may arise in the context of an attorney's cross-examination of a
witness in either a criminal or civil trial context.
The first problem can be vividly illustrated through a defense
counsel's attempting to increase a rape defendant's chances of acquittal by
means of a humniliating or degrading cross-examination of the victim
where the attorney knows that the effects of that cross-examination are
unlikely to significantly promote the accurate resolution of any relevant
issue in the case.' In such a case, the attorney engages in "cross-
examination by harassment" 2 with the intimidation or destruction of a
probably truthful witness3 commonly being sought. Such tactics may also
be calculated to establish an attorney's reputation as an especially
vigorous cross-examiner of rape victims.
A precise understanding of such cross-examinations is really not
necessary for the purposes of this Article. The above formulation might
be varied slightly by thinking of abusive cross-examination as predictably
and unjustifiably distasteful to the current or potential future witness,
where the unjustifiability consists of a lack of substantial grounds for any
belief by the cross-examiner that such a method is necessary to accurately
and significantly shape or discredit the testimony of the witness on a
' See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in TE GOOD LAWYER
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETmcs 25, 27 (David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter
THE GOOD LAWYER]; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Fr'ena& The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.I 1060, 1064-65 (1976)
(describing the moral difficulties a defense lawyer faces when cross-examining a rape
victim).
' RL Gerber, Vctory vs. Truth: The Adversary S ytem and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 3, 14 (1987) (describing how such cross-examination is one of the greatest
impediments to truth).
3See id. It should be noted that deceptive or misleading questions on cross-
examination need not amount to the kinds of actual fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
rejected by legal ethics codes in many contexts. See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643
N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (Ind. 1994) (rejecting misrepresentation by one attorney to another
in a narrow, strict sense).
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contested issue. It may be assumed that attorneys engage in such conduct
for many reasons, but that such conduct is not clearly and invariably
barred by codes of legal ethics.
Of course, legal ethics code limitations on such tactics exist and the
availability of rape shield laws may provide some limitations as well 5
However, these limitations merely set the stage for and do not attempt to
resolve the ethical issues examined below. Ample basis in experience
remains in support of the belief that telling the truth on the witness stand
is no guarantee against a professionally ethically authorized attempt to
destroy dignity and credibility on cross-examination, even where the
questioning attorney is reasonably certain of the veracity of the witness.'
It is, of course, difficult to believe that the reasonable anticipation of such
professionally authorized abusive conduct does not tend to discourage the
appearance of such witnesses! It can be inferred that the professional
ethics codes do not, to put it mildly, invariably mandate the subordination
of the client's interests to the reasonably knowable truth.'
4 See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text.
' Michigan pioneered legislation in this field. See Tanya B. Marcketti, Note, Rape
Shield Laws: Do They Shield the Children?, 78 IoWA L. REv. 751, 753 n.10 (1993); see
also MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1991) (providing the current
version of Michigan's statute). While generally prohibiting introduction of evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct and reputation, rape shield statutes do not purport to solve
the broad problem of abusive or harassing cross-examination in such cases and, even
within their nanow scope, provide for the possibility of exceptions. See J. Alexander
Tanford & Anthony . Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 544, 578-89 (1980) (discussing the possible relevancy of sexual history
evidence). For further discussion of the Michigan statute, see, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas,
500 U.S. 145 (1991) and People v. Powell, 506 N.W.2d 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). For
a discussion of rape shield laws in the context of adversarial ethics, see Deborah L.
Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Te, Subtext, and Context, 41
. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 36-37 (1991).
6 See, e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5 (1951)
(explaining that a lawyer is expected to treat non-clients as "barbarians and enemies");
Gerber, stqra note 2, at 15 (quoting MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' Emics IN THE
ADVERSAIY SYSTM 40-41 (1975)). The claim that lawyers are required by their
professional ethics code to engage in such ruthlessness may be set aside; it is enough for
the purposes of this Article that the relevant professional code merely permits such
behavior, to one degree or another.
7 In a somewhat different context, see DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF
A LAWYER 210-11 (1973) (describing a father's fear of permitting his daughter to testify
,at trial).
' See, e.g., James B. White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorglas and the
Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CaL L. REV. 849, 872 (1983) (describing how a lawyer says "not
what he believes to be true or right," but whatever will promote the client's interests); see
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The second problem concerning cross-examination and legal ethics
illustrates the complex and equivocal interplay of truth with other values
in legal ethics. This sort of problem, like the first, commonly involves the
cross-examination of a witness whom the questioner reasonably believes
to be telling the truth and who is in fact telling the truth. However, this
problem assumes that the only reason the cross-examiner knows the
witness is telling the truth is through a confidential revelation by the
cross-examiner's own client, induced by the cross-examiner's advance
promise that such a confidential revelation will not be used to the client's
prejudice.
The problem is sharpened by the further assumption that the cross-
examiner's client, although in fact innocent of the charged offense or
entitled to prevail in a civil case, is unlikely to prevail due to the apparent
weight of other evidence. In some cases, an innocent client may face
devastating adverse evidence. Thus, it is assumed that the client's chances
of obtaining a just verdict would be materially increased if the cross-
examining attorney were able to somehow discredit what the attorney
knows, only under the above conditions, to be the truthfu and accurate
testimony of an opposing witness? Sometimes, the truthful and accurate
testimony of an adverse witness may seem far more incriminating than
it really is. The attorney may be able to foresee a jury's overreaction to
such testimony. In such a case, the cross-examiner must consider not only
the problem of the appropriate use of the client's induced disclosure, but,
more interestingly, the ethical problem of deliberately attempting to
mislead the trier of fact, through discrediting a known truthful and
accurate witness, for the sake of a just verdict.
Of course, every general statement of a problem in legal ethics
abstracts away from the variations and uncertainties of real cases. But the
two basic scenarios sketched above can be developed sufficiently to be
resolved, rightly or wrongly, under existing. codes of legal ethics. Those
professional ethical judgments can then be critiqued or enriched by
recourse to broader ethical traditions. it is possible that we might be so
convinced of the rightness of the judgments within established legal
ethics that we come to resolve all conflicts between judgments of legal
ethics and those of our broader ethical traditions in favor of the former.
also Fried, supra note 1, at 1062 (referring to the practce of "discrediting a nervous but
probably t=Whful complaining witness").
9 See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crininal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Queslions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1474-75 (1966)
(describing how an attomy's failure to cross-examine a witness solely because his client
has been candid with him should be precluded).
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We might thus become so convinced of the moral soundness of contem-
porary legal ethics codes that we would wish to limit, modify, make
exceptions to, or even repudiate one or more broader moral perspectives
incompatible with our legal ethical judgments. But this result seems
unlikely. Given the breadth of scope and experience embodied in famili
broader approaches to moral philosophy in general, we may more
realistically expect instead to find ourselves reassessing our legal ethics
codes, or at least rethinking their grounds and rationale.
Both types of problems in legal ethics outlined above, abuse and
deception, may be characterized in broader ethical terms. It is close to the
essence of each sort of problem that a possible conflict arises between
following a traditionally respected general moral rule, such as treating
others with a level of respect, and increasing the chances of obtaining a
supposedly good or just outcome, such as the acquittal of the innocent or
the proper, vigorous functioning of the adversary system."0
Plainly, these two scenarios do not pose a clear, unequivocal conflict
between a moral rule and a good end without further complication. The
most important complications will be discussed below." First, we must
recognize the conflicts raised by the two scenarios and place them in a
broader moral context.
The two scenarios would seem to implicate possible general moral
rules prohibiting, in the first case, the abuse, degradation, or humiliation
of a person and, in the second case, the intentional deception or
misleading of a person. These sorts of rules, to which many lawyers
would be inclined to gravitate at least when "off duty," have clearly been
popular in several important moral traditions.' Bt the two scenarios
also raise, to differing degrees, the possibility of some morally good
benefit from creating exceptions to or declining to follow such rules.
Such moral payoffs might include the morally just disposition of the case
itself the benefits flowing from an adversary system operating as
intended, and even the moral value of arriving at legal truth obtainable
in no way other than through deception.
The possibility of tradeoffs between following familiar moral rules
and obtaining morally good outcomes should be both obvious and
11 Of course, conflicts between rles may arise in these contexts. For example, a
lawyer may point to a real or alleged conflict between a general moral rule against
misleading or deceiving anyone, inchluding a jury, and a general moral rule against
betraying induced confidences, including those of a client However, this conflict is not
central to the general moral problem.
11See infra notes 36-112 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 36-80 and accompanying text.
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disturbing in the litigation context as well as in the broader moral realm.
If good ends do not always justify otherwise immoral means, it seems
equally doubtful that no good end, of any magnitude, could ever justify
the use of even a minimally immoral means. 3 Truth-telling, for exam-
ple, may sometimes impose uncomfortably high costs in wounded
feelings, if not in lives themselves.14
Faced with such conflicts and in order to avoid potentially unattrac-
tive outcomes of moral rule-following, we may seek to relieve the
tensions by endorsing all sorts of exceptions to the relevant moral rules
or by narrowing the application of the rules themselves either generally
or on an ad hoc basis. 5 Of course, limits to editing moral rules to fit
our collective sensibilities in detail must exist, or the idea of a genuine
moral rule becomes unrecognizable. On the other hand, any attempt to
"balance," in a principled, non-arbitrary way, the value of a generally
applicable moral rule against the disastrous or unattractive consequences
of following that rule seems difficult, if not impossible in principle."
Nor can we plausibly avoid the conflicts by claiming that no violation of
any credible moral rule is ever likely to avert a disaster or result in
otherwise unattainable good consequences. 7
Both inside and outside the courtroom, then, we feel the pull of moral
rules, typically focusing on intention and state of mind and, in an
opposite direction, the pull of achieving good or avoiding bad conse-
quences. But we lack a principled way of commensurating rules or
intentions on the one hand, and consequences, including attainable goods,
on the other.
This situation is in some respects analogous to the current state of
affairs faced by physicists. Physicists find themselves at ease when their
'3 See Don Locke, The Choice Between Lives, 57 PHIL. 453, 472 (1982) (discussing
how, to be justifiable, a particular good end must outweigh the drawbacks of the
particular means used).14 See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, MoRALITY, UTILTARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 309
(1992) (discussing how it is possible to exercise a moral virtue to excess).
" See, e.g., JOHN J.C. SMART & BERNARD WIUAMS, UTxrAIRANSM: FOR ANID
AGAINST 90 (1973) (discussing non-absolute, non-universal, heavily qualified moral
rules).
16 See, e.g., id. at 73.
'7 While the nature and magnitude of the net payoff from secretly or openly violating
a purportedly moral rule may be uncertain, some consequences may be so clearly
important that failing to consider them would be morally iresponsible. At best, a healthy
but rebuttable skepticism toward our ability to assess the major consequences of our
actions, including the effects on our own character, may be justified. See THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONS]BmIIY
88-90 (1994) (providing a related discussion).
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quantum theory can be applied in the absence of any significant gravitational
effects and when their theory of gravity can be applied in the absence of any
significant quantum effects. However, physicists currently have no consensu-
ally attractive, well-developed method of fiuly analyzing cases in which both
quantum and gravitational effects are significant."
By analogy, we in the legal field feel most comfortable when a lawyer'
violation of a purported moral rule either resulted in no significant net
benefits or was necessary to avoid obvious moral disaster. But when
intentions (or the status of a moral rule) and the good or bad effects of
following that moral rle both seem significant, we tend to lapse into
arbitrariness and dogmatism.
Genuinely reconciling the roles of intentions or moral rules and the role
of outcomes or consequences is probably impossible. However, the possibility
of a partial, pragmatic, but not entirely arbitrary accommodation of intention
and outcome through a moral focus on the idea of character is suggested and
explored below." First, though, the force and limits of broader moral rule-
based critiques of established legal ethics must be considered in general and
in the context of the two legal ethical problems discussed earlier.2' Once the
force of a moral rule-based or intention-based critique of current adversary
practice and the limits of such a critique are appreciated, one can consider the
role of the idea of character in reasonably resolving some of the remaining
tensions between putative moral rules and the goods achievable under an
adversary system only by violating such moral rules. 21
Significant changes in contemporary legal ethics are morally required?
This is in part due to the conflicts between some established rules of legal
ethics and the trumping status of sound broader moral rules. Some rules of
legal ethics may, even where not clearly overridden by broader moral rules,
nonetheless fail what may be called the test of promoting sound character.
IL RELEVANT RULES OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ETmcs
The legal establishment does not, of course, concede the broader
immorality of any common patterns of attorney conduct mandated or
authorized by relevant codes of legal ethics. The attorneys' focus on the
S See, e.g., JOHN D. BARRow, THE ORIGIN OF THE UNVERSE 88-89 (1994);
MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, MIND, BRAiN, AND THE QUANTUM 286-87 (1989).
See infra notes 36-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text; see also spra notes 2-10 and
accompanying text (reviewing the legal ethical problems).
"See infra part V.
"See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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interests of their clients may strike some outsiders as excessive. However,
the legal establishment may respond that, in a properly functioning
adversary system, what outsiders see as immoral behavior (as in the two
cross-examination scenarios introduced above)' may be necessary to
achieve important moral goods, including justice for more litigants,"
regardless of whether such a result is intended by the attorneys.
Let us consider, then, the prohibitions and permissions of the current
edition of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct most directly relevant to the two cross-examination scenarios. To
begin with, the preamble of the Model Rules sets the tone in observing,
if not requiring, that "as advocate, a lawyer [should] zealously assert[ ]
the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." The
preamble continues to the effect that "a lawyer should use the law's
procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate
others." '2 The problem with this and similar language, though, is that
such may authorize harassment or intimidation where those tactics are
reasonably thought to genuinely serve the interests of the client, as
opposed to harassment or intimidation that is merely gratuitous
Presumably, tactics involving harassment or intimidation may tend, more
or less plausibly, to have some meaningful relation to the client's interests
and thus be justified under the Model Rules.
The adversary ethos, in our context, begins with the uncontroversial
assumption that "cross-examination ... is a probing, prying, pressing
2 See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
:4 For a statement, without endorsement, of such an approach, see, e.g., Wasserstrim,
spra note 1, at 30.
25 MoDu. RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUCt Preamble (1993); see also Walters v.
National Ass'nof Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 324 (1985) ("'[L]awyers, by training
and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available
evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all
adverse evidence and views.") (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88
(1973)).
2 See MODEL RuLEs OF PIopESSIONAL CoNDuc'r Preamble.
7 See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 95 (1980) (noting that under a prior Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
the advocate "is not to degrade witnesses by irrelevant questions, but can (and perhaps
must) degrade them if it is helpful to his client's cause"); see also Stephen Gillers, Can
a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1021 n.24 (1986)
(intetreing MODEL Rula OF PRO iwSSiO L CONDUCT Rule 4.4, as forbidding the use
of tactics with "no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person"). More broadly, see Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,
37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 600-02 (1985) (discussing the ABA's approach to the adversary
system).
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form of inquiry." However, even the most abusive, deceptive, or
misleading cross-examinations need not involve any false representations
of fact or be otherwise groundless under the Model Rules. In fact,
conduct that could well be considered morally unjustified outside the
adversary context is commonly thought permissible, if not mandatory,
within it. Judge Henry Friendly has been quoted by a plurality of the U.S.
Supreme Court to the effect that "[w]ithin the limits of professional
propriety," it may be the advocate's professional right or duty to "sow[ ]
confusion."3 Similarly, within some limits, the attorney "will cross-
examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he
thinks the witness is telling the truth .... 31
Thus if the cross-examiner, particularly in criminal cases, "can
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvan-
tage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course." As Judge
Jerome Frank observed:
[A]n experienced lawyer uses all sorts of stratagems to minimize the
effect on the judge or jury of testimony disadvantageous to his client,
even when the lawyer has no doubt of the accuracy and honesty of that
testimony. The lawyer considers it his duty to create a false impression,
if he can, of any witness who gives such testimony.33
Given the premise that the cross-examiner is reasonably certain that the
witness is providing accurate testimony, the observed or recommended
strategy on cross-examination, consistent with legal ethics, is to engage
in harassing, misleading, or deceptive questioning.' Of course, many
broader ethical traditions generally 6bject to such conduct. However,
current legal ethics seek to defend such practices as conducive to, if not
necessary for, some good state of affairs, such as a just outcome or the
' Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973) (holding that a literally true,
unresponsive answer should be remedied by cross-examination, not by contempt).
See Gillers, supra note 27, at 1021 n.24.
SWalters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325-26 (1985)
(quoting Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1287
(1975)).
31 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concuring in part).
32 Id. at 257 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
3 JERoME FRANK, CouITs ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REAL=r IN AMEiCAN JUSTICE
82 (1973), quoted in part in Wade, 388 U.S. at 257 n.6 (White, 3., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
" See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text
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effective operation of an adversary system thought superior to others in
arriving at the truth or in producing just outcomes.
In these respects, the defenses of our current legal ethics and of the
adversay system shall be considered. 5 First; though, the nature of the
traditional broad ethical objections to abusive or misleading conduct, even
when engaged in to further some asserted morally important goal, must be
examined.
II. TRADITIONAL ETHICAL OBJECTIONS TO ENGAGING
IN ABUSE AND DECEPTION FOR THE SAKE OF A GOOD RESULT
A number of broad ethical traditions cast doubt on the legitimacy of
engaging in abuse and deception for the sake of some good result. In the
Kantian tradition, one must treat all rational persons with respect and dignity
and as ends in themselves, rather than as merely a means to some desirable
goal ' This tradition requires the avoidance of outright lying, even for the
sake of great benefits. 7 Kant however, qualified this rule to a certain extent
He concluded that "[t]he forcing of a statement from me under conditions
which convince me that improper use would be made of it is the only case
in which I can be justified in telling a white lie."
An attorney lying on behalf of a client may try to defend such action by
analogy to the presumed inclination to lie on behalf of one' spouse.39 And
it can be argued that the good consequences of some lies could include more
truth-telling, or fewer lies, in the future. The crucial issue under legal ethics
codes and in our two scenarios, however, does not involve outright lying, but
abuse and deception.
Kantian theory requires respect for other persons.4 It seems clear that
for Kant such respect requires "that we avoid contempt, mockery, disdain,
s See infra notes 81-112 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Fowdations of Morals, in THE
PHH.OSOPHY OF KANT 140, 177-78 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949).
7 See, e.g., ROGER J. SULLAN, IMMANUEL KANT's MORAL THEORY 171 (1991).
" IMMANUEL KANT, LEGUS ON ETHICS 228 (Louis Infield tram., Hackett
Publishing 1963) (1930); see also SULLIvAN, supra note 37, at 173 (discussing Kant's
theories).
39 See Curtis, supra note 6, at 8.
40See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND
POLrIICAL LEGInIMACY 128-29 (1982) (discussing how Kant ranks morality above
legality); Albert R. Dilanni, The DirectIncrect Distinction in Morals, 41 THOMIST 350,
377 (1977) (explaining that the murder of an innocent is wrong because it violates the
person's dignity); Stephen Theron, Two Criticisms of Double Effect, 58 NEW SCHOLAS-
TICIsM 67, 67 (1984) (discussing the Kantian principle of treating humanity as an end
rather than merely a means).
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detraction and the like .... ,. On its face, this principle would seem
to encompass our cases of abuse and perhaps even deception upon cross-
examination. No obvious Kantian grounds exist for an exception referring
to the cross-examiner's officially designated role within the institution of
the adversarial trial.
Some sort of contradiction may be involved in some respect in
deceiving a jury 2 A juror, for example, who is deceived on some point
cannot, presumably, at the same time and in that very same respect
deceive either the attorney or any other juror. But one might well wonder
why this particular form of contradiction marks the presence of an
immoral act. The cross-examiner might agree with Kant that deception
generally impairs the purpose or value of communication, in a loosely
self-contradictory way.43 But this finding hardly ends the story. Might
some instances of deception, perhaps committed by our cross-examiner,
be necessary to lead the jury to a larger and more important legal truth
and thus crucially facilitate the purpose of trial communication? Might a
reasonable jury be imagined to consent to its own deception in just such
cases?
It is hardly objectionable that the adversary system should, in its
operation, treat all persons with dignity and respect.' It is possible to
argue the adversary system, in general, does precisely that.45 Even so,
an issue of severability remains. Assuming it could be shown that the
adversary system in general promotes and embodies respect and dignity,
it would still be doubtful that abuse or deception by attorneys embodies
that respect and dignity. It is also doubtful that such abuse or deception
is genuinely inseparable from the morally valuable operation of the
adversary system in general, or that to restrict attorney abuse and
deception would, in practice, impair that moral value.
It is possible to conclude at this point that a Kantian critique of
attorney abuse of witnesses or deception of jurors may be developed,
despite the permission or mandate of our codes of legal ethics to engage
41 ONoRA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: ExPLORATIONS OF KANT'S
PRACtICAL PHELOSOPHY 115 (1989).4 2 See generally SULIVAN, stiqra note 37, at 170-73 (discussing Kant's theories).
43 See id. at 170-71.44See, e.g., Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversay Sstem, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, szqira note 1, at 123, 146; Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the
Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, spra note 1, at 38, 46.
41 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1057 n.68 (1975); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. 1. 543, 548.
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in such practices. Such a critique may not be decisive, though, at least
where an attorney can point to some important moral good, including
insight into the truth, obtainable only through deception.46
Let us turn, then, to a related broad ethical tradition that also
generally bars abuse or deception even for the sake of a morally attractive
outcome. This approach, the value of which has been endorsed by noted
contemporary ethicists such as Professor Thomas Nagel,' is commonly
referred to as the principle of double effect. This view holds that an
important moral distinction exists between harm to others that is intended,
either as an end or as a means to some good result, and harm that is
foreseeable or predictable but is not intended by the actor, occurring
instead merely as a side effect of what the actor does intend. Professor
Gilbert Harman concisely states the view:
[W]hile it is an objection to a proposed course of action that it will
harm someone, the objection is considerably more weighty if the harm
is intended, either as one's aim or as a means to achieving one's end,
than if the harm is merely foreseen as a side effect of one's action.4
"Plato recommended, for example, that children be told "that no one has ever had
a quarrel with a fellow citizen," presumably for the sake of reducing future quarrels, and,
more interestingly, for the sake of aiding the overall moral character development of the
child - a goal that our cross-examiner may find difficult to assert in parallel THE
REPUBLIC Op PLATO, BOOK Two 70 (F.M. Comford trans., 1945).47 See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 179 (1986); see also Thomas
Nagel, War and Massacre, in CONSEQuNI AuSM AND ITS CRITICS 51, 58 (Samuel
Scheffler ed., 1988).
"Gilbert Harman, Explaining Value, in CULTMRAL PLURALISM AND MORAL
KNOWLEDGE 229, 242 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1994). For a selection of alternative
fornulations, see, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 21-22 (1978) (describing
how certain bad results can be tolerated if they are viewed as "the foreseen concomitants
of one's chosen means or ends"); Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Who Is Entitled to Double Effect?,
16 J. MED. & PHIL. 475, 475 (1991) (explaining that a result can be permissible as a side
effect of a particular action); John M. Fischer et al., Quinn on Double Effect: The
Problem of "Closeness," 103 ETHIcS 707, 707 (1993) (discussing reasons not to pursue
a good when the harm is an intended means instead of only foreseen); Frances M. Kamm,
The Doctrine of Double Effect: Reflections on Theoretical and Practical Issues, 16 J.
MED. & PHIL. 571, 571 (1991) (explaining that a bad side effect of an action is
permissible if it is outweighed by the good produced by such action); and Warren S.
Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PiL.
& PUB. AFF. 334, 335 (1989) (exploring the crucial implication that "the pursuit of a
good tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is intended as a means than where
it is merely foreseen"). The principle is sometimes said to prohibit "direct" or "directly
willed" as opposed to "indirect" harms. See, e.g., FRIED, stpra, at 21-22; Dilanni, suqra
note 40, at 351 (distinguishing between direct and indirect harms); Locke, supra note 13,
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The principle is often conjoined to the further requirement that the act in
question must not be itself morally wrong, aside from the morality of its
consequences or effects.49 In any event, it can certainly be plausibly
argued that our cases of abuse and deception through cross-examination
may ordinarily call into play the principle of double effect.
This discussion does not suggest that the principle of double effect
or its application is clear and unproblematic. It seems clear that one can
indeed intend something as a means, rather than as an end in itself"
Thus, it is perfectly possible for our cross-examiner to intend abuse and
deception as a means to some further desired goal, such as the acquittal
of the client. Those versions of the principle that rely upon the idea of the
moral quality of an act or intention by itself, apart from its effects or
consequences, introduce an initial problem. Despite the familiarity of the
idea, it is far from clear that we can, or would want to, assess the
morality of an act or intention apart from any intended, likely, foresee-
able, or actual consequences.
We may admittedly want to morally blame a cross-examiner who
intends abuse or deception even if no actual abuse or deception happens
to occur. Suppose that the attorney misphrases a question that was
intended to be, and to be perceived by the witness as, abusive," or that
the attorney's attempt to deceive or mislead the jury through cross-
at 470 (distinguishing between direct and indirect killins). This usage seems unnecessari-
ly misleading, in that one can clearly intend something to occur as the last, indirect link
in a chain of causes and effects.
11 See, e.g., James G. Hanink, Some Light on Double Effect, 37 ANALYSIS 147, 150
(1975); James F. Keenan, The Function of the Principle ofDouble Effect, 54 THEOLOGI-
CAL STUD. 294, 300 (1993).
'5 See Fischer et al., supra note 48, at 707, 712 (discussing a purported 'right not to
be deceived").
"1 See, e.g., Anthony Kenny, Intention and Purpose, 63 J. PHIL. 642, 647 (1966);
Kwong-Loi Shun, Intending as a Means, 66 PAC. PHIL. Q. 216, 221 (1985).
' See, e.g., Dilanni, supra note 40, at 350; Raymond G. Frey, Some Aspects to the
Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 CAN. J. PHIL. 259, 259 (1975) ("The act to be done,
considered in itself and apart from its consequences, must not be intrinsically wrong.');
James F. Keenan, Taking Aim at the Principle ofDouble Effect: Reply to Khatchadourian,
28 INT'L PHIL. Q. 201, 201 (1988) (arguing against the principle of double effect); Donald
B. Marquis, Some Diffculties with Double Effect, 9 Sw. . PHIL. 27, 27 (1978) (referring
to the idea that some acts "are bad in themselves - that is, independently of the
consequences produced by them").
0 One might argue that nobody ever strictly intends abuse or deception; our cross-
examiner intends only to say or do things that are commonly thought of; or thought of
by the wiless, as abusive or deceptive. While this point may need developing in some
contexts, it is inconsequential for the purposes of this Article.
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examination is transparent and fails miserably. While we might want to
blame the attorney and prohibit such conduct, even though no bad
consequences actually resulted, it is not obvious why we would take the
trouble to prohibit such conduct. The idea of an action apart from any
consequences at all may not even be coherent, as some exponents of the
principle of double effect recognize.'
Another possible problem may also be considered. The principle of
double effect has often been associated historically with absolutism in
ethics - the idea of universal, exceptionless moral rules.55 Absolutism
in this sense would undesirably direct that a moral rule against deception
should be followed even if one knew that an act of deception would be
necessary to prevent some catastrophic moral horror.'
Such moral absolutism is not required by the principle of double
effect as it has been stated. Certainly, one must not intend a moral
wrong, as a means or end, but this does not imply any theory of why the
act or intention is morally wrong. Perhaps abuse and deception are always
morally wrong, wherever and whenever practiced, regardless of the
circumstances. An attorney's abuse or deception might equally be called
wrong because, for example, some group has agreed that for the relevant
time period, one form of abuse or deception on cross-examination of a
particular witness violates a narrow moral rule barring just such conduct.
The principle of double effect faces other challenges, however. Most
obviously, the principle requires some sort of practically usable distinc-
tion between what the actor intends and what the actor foresees without
intent. But this is a slippery distinction, as we know from the law's
frequent willingness to infer that actors intend the natural, probable, or
foreseeable consequences of their acts.58 Further, it is difficult to believe
that any socially imbedded act, such as a cross-examination, will normally
have only one legitimate description, to the exclusion of other ways of
describing that act.59
' See, e.g., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward an Understand'ng of the Principle of
Double Effect, 90 ETICS 527, 532 (1980); see also T.M. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and
Fairness, in CONSEQUENTIALSM AND ITS CRITIcS, smqra note 47, at 73, 74 ("Unless
rights are to be taken as defined by rather implausible rigid fonnulae, it seems that we
must invoke what looks very much like the consideration of consequences in order to
determe what they rule out and what they allow.").
" See, e.g., Marquis, supra note 52, at 33.
See SAMUEL SCHELR TH REJECTION OF CONSEQuEnIAUSM 86 (1982).
s See Boyle, supra note 54, at 537; Boyle, supra note 48, at 481.
See, e.g., Kenny, supra note 51, at 642.
"See Phillip E. Devine, The Principle of Double Effect, 19 AM J. JUIS. 44, 48
(1975).
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For example, some acts of apparently intentional killing may be
redescribed as acts of intended self-defense.' Is the death in such cases
a mere predictable side effect and never a presumably strongly regretted
but necessary means to the end of saving one's own life? Is a soldier's
decision to jump on a live grenade only an act of saving one's comrades
and not, under an equally valid description, a noble or self-sacrificing
intentional suicide?6 Why not re-characterize our cross-examiner's
abusive or deceptive language as merely an attempt to arrive at justice or
a more crucial truth in perhaps the only way possible?'
However, limits exist to the extent to which acts and intentions can
be redescribed.' Typically, revelers foresee, but do not intend, the
resulting hangover." In applying a car's brakes, one similarly does not
normally intend to wear down those brakes.65 Consequences that are
chosen as a means to some further goal cannot invariably be plausibly
redescribed as unintended and merely foreseen. Certainly this is" true in
our cross-examination scenarios. Inescapably, attorneys choose to engage
in abuse or deception in those contexts precisely because they think such
conduct will lead causally to some desired end; thus, they select such
conduct as a means. I
It might then be argued, though, that even if the distinction between
intention and mere foresight is clear enough in our cross-examination
cases, it is often not morally significant, even if we attend to only the
cross-examiner's state of mind. Intending and foreseeing, it may be said,
tell us little about whether what is intended or foreseen is, for example,
See ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MoRAIrry 160 (1977).
For discussion of these issues, see R.A. Dua Absolute Principles and Double
Effect, 36 ANALYSIS 68, 78 (1976); and Hanink, supra note 49, at 151.
' For further discussion of this problem, see, e.g., Nancy Davis, The Doctrine of
Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation, 65 PAC. PHIL. Q. 107, 114 (1984); and
Suzanne M. Uniake, The Doctrine of Double Effect, 48 THOMIST 188, 199 (1984). See
also Sanford S. Levy, The Principle ofDouble Effect, 20 J. VALUE INQUIRY 29, 38 (1986)
(describing side effects as part of an overall plan).
See Theron, supra note 40, at 76.
"See Kenny, supra note 51, at 644.
Clearly, in at least some sense, drivers who apply their brakes do not, for example,
intend to hasten the day on which their brakes will require costly replacement See Robert
Hoffman, Intention, Double Effect, and Sngle Result, 44 PHIL. & PHENON. RES. 389, 390
(1984) (explaining that one does not usually sprinkle one's pepper with the intent to
decrease one's stock); Marquis, supra note 52, at 28-29 (explaining that a shopper does
not intend to purchase the costliest item in the store, even if she intends to purchase the
item answering that description). But see Antony Duff, Intention, Responsibility and
Double Effect, 32 PHIL. Q. 1, 3 (1982) (discussing an attempt to distinguish between
purposive and non-purposive intentions).
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bitterly regretted or anticipated with ghoulish relish. Our cross-examiner
may be genuinely pained by the cross-examinations. Certainly, the actor
need not desire an intended means for its own sake as well;" the actor
may sincerely regret its necessity. On the other hand, while foresight need
not involve any desire that the foreseen event occur,' an unintended but
foreseen side effect might be anticipated with fiendish delight.6
The fact that one intends a result merely as a means is still morally
significant in our context. Our cross-examiner presumably considered the
relevant moral principles and consciously chose to abuse or mislead the
witness or jury for the sake of some goal. The cross-examiner presumably
could have done otherwise, whether or not these tactics were sincerely
regretted. The possibility of a less abusive or misleading cross-examina-
tion was available but rejected, attempts by such attorneys to avoid full
moral responsibility thus seem unpersuasive.
This discussion does not suggest that an attorney who relishes such
cross-examinations is in this respect morally equivalent to an attorney
who regrets them, even if their methods of cross-examination are
identical. But the distinction between intent and mere foresight does not
become trivial in our contexts. Related questions of character are
considered below.69 However, the scenario of the "roommate choice"
may provide insight at this juncture.
Suppose that person A needs a roommate. The details of A's
circumstances may vary widely. Suppose further that A is confronted with
a choice between potential roommates B and C. As it turns out, B and C
are in most relevant respects identical. As it also turns out, B's work
typically involves actions with no intended harms, but B does foresee
harms of a certain degree of severity. However, C's work typically
involves harms that C actually intends, as an end or means, of the same
degree of severity of consequences as those inflicted without intent by B.
Additionally, A knows nothing about whether they relish or regret the
harms involved in their work and knows nothing about the degree of
positive good done by B or C.
Now if A wishes to choose reasonably between B and C, protecting
optimally A's own basic interests, must A conclude that the choice
See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 48, at 23.
See Boyle, supra note 54, at 535-36; Norvin Richards, Double Effect and Moral
Character, 93 MIND 381, 388-89 (1984).
"Failing to prevent an unintended but foreseen event may, in some cases, bespeak
a horrifying moral indifference. See SHEILY KAGAN, THE LIMrTs oF MORALIY 170
(1989).
'See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
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between B and C is utterly arbitrary and that the choice of B or C is
apparently equally risky? In fact, though, A does have at least some
minimal, if not entirely satisfactory, basis for reasonably preferring B.
Intention, or a stable pattern of repeated intention over time, seems to
matter, practically and morally, largely because it more directly and
reliably suggests what may be called character."
This example is not designed to minimize the complexities of the
moral evaluations we must make of prospective roommates, or of
attorneys. We may, for example, tend over time to become desensitized
to harms we do not intend, as well as to harms we do intend. Or our
cross-examiner might, while still intending abuse or deception, nonethe-
less be able to focus her own subjective attention during the cross-
examination on the good she hopes to obtain and not on the abuse or
deception. Some might argue that such an ability reduces any ill effects
on one's character of intending harm; others might demur.
Finally, our cross-examiner might argue that she really should not be
morally taxed with abuse or deception, as she would be well pleased if
some route to an equally high probability of justice or acquittal that did
not require abuse or deception were available. IC by some fluke or
miracle, the intended abuse did not turn out to be genuinely abusive of
the witness, or if the attempt at deception failed completely but the jury
nevertheless decided the case appropriately, our cross-examiner might not
be disappointed.7
This claim, though, show- only that our cross-examiner does not
value abuse or deception as an end in itself. The cross-examiners cannot
dissociate themselves from their choice of means to an end by envision-
ing a world in which they could somehow attain that end without a
deceptive or abusive intent. Attorneys who intend abuse or deception do
I Of course, considerations other than character may be relevant to the roommate
choice problem. Some may argue, for example, that intending that someone not receive
some good is worse than acting without any intention, because the former is a graver and
more direct violation of a duty to will good for other people. See, e.g., Jorge LA. Garc,
The New Critique ofAnti-Consequentialist Moral Theory, 71 PHIL. STUD. 1, 6 (1993). If
we loosen the stipulations built into the roommate choice problem, we might come to
believe that, despite our proclivity for bungling, bad outcomes are generally more likely
to occur if they are intended and not merely foreseen. See Kenny, stqira note 51, at 650.
"For discussion of the possible relevance of scenarios in which an actor is pleased
with a desired outcome despite the failure of the means chosen to obtain that outcome,
see Devine, supra note 59, at 54-55; Alan Donagan, Moral Absolutism and the Double
Effect Exception Reflections on Joseph Boyle's Who Is Entitled to Double Effect?, 16 J.
MED. & PHIL. 495, 496 (1991); Frey, supra note 52, at 263-64; and Uniake, supra note
62, at 208-09.
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not reasonably expect that their cross-examinations will somehow turn out
not to be abusive or deceptive. And again, this fact seems important
because we do not normally consider a merely idle, abstract preference
for getting what one wants without immorality to be a significant mark
of good character.
At this point, it can be concluded that in the context of this Article,
the principle of double effect, with its emphasis on a moral distinction
between intent and mere foresight, has some coherence, relevance, and
force. One significant unresolved problem with the principle, though, is
the possibility that a minor violation of the principle could have
substantial moral payoffs. Cross-examinations that just barely breach
some moral rule against intentional harm might be reasonably necessary
to obtain an important moral good. An important moral payoff, such as
justice for the client or the proper functioning of a necessary component
of an otherwise moral litigation system, may seem to justify some degree
of intentional injury. We might well prefer some minimally wrongful
intent, if necessary for an important moral result, to an intent to avoid
harm in the course of obtaining only a grossly morally unattractive
outcome.
Thus the principle of double effect must, in the context of our cross-
examinations, confront the possible desirability of crossing a moral line.
But here, it is important to distinguish between our two cross-examination
scenarios. The case of abusive cross-examination of a rape victim less
readily lends itself to considerations of an achievable good sufficient to
justify some degree of abuse. This is so even if the intent only barely
crosses the relevant moral line and the actual effect on the victim is small
by comparison with what other rape victims may face on cross-examina-
tion. Some moral rules are more serious than others. Obvious issues of
inequality and social justice for victims in such cases are simply not
paralleled in the merely deceptive cross-examination cases. In particular,
it is difficult to imagine how any degree of abuse of a rape victim on
cross-examination could benefit women, or future rape victims, in
general.
But in this context, the principle of double effect faces a special
problem, the real significance of the moral distinction between intended
and unintended, even unforeseen, harms. It may generally be true that
intended harm is, in the abstract, morally worse than unintended or
unrecognized harm.' But in the particular context of the cross-examina-
tion of rape victims, unintended but reasonably foreseeable harms may
' See supra note 70 and ancompanying text.
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actually be as morally serious as intended harms.' It is perfectly
reasonable to find a prosecutor's obtuseness and insensitivity in this
context to be equally, if not more galling or frustrating than even some
borderline degree of intentional abuse, given the substantial efforts to
educate those involved in the criminal justice system to be more alert to
such presumably unintended harms. Pervasive, continuing, and malign
indifference may be as disrespectful as some degree of intentional injury.
The principle of double effect need not utterly discount unintended
harms. But it does not seem by itself a suitable vehicle to assess the
morality of unintentional and intentional harmful cross-examination of
rape victims. Again, part of the solution involves a greater concern for
character.74 To remain grossly insensitive to, unaware ot or indifferent
to patterns of one's own unintended injuries to rape victims, despite
decades of relevant publicity and the debunking of stereotypes, is, among
other things, indicative of bad character.
If we expand our focus beyond our two cross-examination scenarios,
it is possible to cast further doubt on the adequacy of the double effect
principle in the litigation context. In an especially interesting passage,
Professor David Luban has characterized a common understanding of the
American Civil Liberties Union's ("ACLU") litigation strategy as
appealing for justification to the principle of double effect.75 Under this
view, the ACLU's real intent is to promote the Bill of Rights." In some
cases, promoting the interests of unsavory clients is said to be "an
unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of advancing principles" to which
the ACLU is committed.'
Here, two points must be made. First, the claim that the ACLU
advances the interests of some unsavory clients only as an unintended by-
product or side effect is not plausible. Certainly, if the ACLU could
optimally promote the Bill of Rights without promoting the interests of
their least attractive clients, they would be pleased. The ACLU may in
fact regret promoting the interests of such parties. But such is not a test
of intention. Given the nature of the causal chains involved, it is clear
' For relevant examples and discussion, see, e.g., SUSAN BROWNUMIER, AGAST
OUR WIL.: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 372-73 (1975); and SUSAN EsucH, REAL RAPE
55-56 (1987).
74 The author assumes at this point that most contemporary codes of ethical
responsibility do not adequately prohibit or discourage attorneys' insensitivity or
indifference to their assumedly unintentional injuries to testifyng rape victims.
' See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 738-39 (1988).76 d.
Id. at 738.
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that the ACLU promotes the interests of unsavory clients as a presumably
necessary means to the intended end, the flourishing of civil liberties.78
Promoting the interests of the unsavory, while not intended as an end in
itselt is still intended as a means. Thus, if it is somehow morally wrong
for the ACLU to intentionally promote the interests of the unsavory, the
ACLU commits a wrong.
The second point to be made is that such a claim may impeach the
principle of double effect more than it impeaches the morality of the
ACLU. If we strongly value civil liberties and see no other way to
promote civil liberties, then we may, as a matter of homespun moral
balancing, determine that this large net payoff of moral good justifies the
ACLU's use of presumably immoral means.
This last point reflects the difficulties that the principles of double
effect and Kantianism have in a situation where committing a wrongful
act will apparently result in a greater moral good, avoidance of disaster,
or even fewer wrongful acts in the future. If one is convinced that a
minimal lie will probably save many lives, then many would probably
consider the lie to be morally justified.' Similarly, many persons would
be inclined to accept intentional deception in the course of a cross-
examination if that deception were necessary to, and likely to result in,
the acquittal of a group of unjustly accused criminal defendants." We
are thus left with conflicting impulses regarding the rules of legal ethics
and the justifiability of immoral means in litigation.
IV. ABUSE, DECEPTION, AND THE INsTITUTION
OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Cross-examinations occur in an institutional context, with the
participants occupying prescribed institutional roles within an adversary
system. The adversary system itself is defined and limited by case law,
statutes, relevant rules or codes of professional responsibility, and
constitutional principles. We must ask, then, whether this institutional
71 Id. at 738-39.
It is interesting to note that, while most codes of legal ethics do not fully respect
obvious applications of the principle of double effect, they also do not build in genemal
exceptions to rules against lying to the court in even extreme cases. Thus, for example,
the Model Rides state flatly that lawyers "shall not knowingly ... make a false statement
of material fact or law to a tribunal." See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 3.3(a)(1).
so Issues of broader social justice are briefly considered later. See infra notes 124-30
and accompanying text.
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context dissolves the problem of arguably immoral attorney conduct,
as in our abuse and deception cases, that the rules of legal ethics
permit
It might be noted by analogy that many persons look upon private
selfishness more benignly if convinced, like Bernard Mandeville" and
Adam Smith, ' that private selfishness, properly institutionalized within
a functioning economic market, conduces to the public benefit, even in
the absence of any intention to promote that public good. Operating
within an authorized role in general can certainly make a difference.'
We do not, for example, morally blame or legally condemn meter readers
for what would otherwise be a trespass, or think of prison guards as
kidnappers.
How much otherwise morally objectionable conduct by attorneys can
be institutionally justified is a broad and controversial question But it
seems clear that even the deeply institutionalized character of cross-
examination cannot simply immunize all authorized conduct from moral
scrutiny. Even if the attorney's role as an officer of the court tends to
legitimize any authorized conduct by the attorney, that same role may
itself suggest limits to adversary zeal even beyond those currently
imposed by professional ethics codes.'
Thus, it is quite possible to conclude that the institutionally required
and permitted conduct of the cross-examiner should, in some respects, be
changed for moral reasons." It is also fair to conclude that individual
attorneys share in the appropriate moral blame for actions currently
" See BERNARD MANDE IL., THE FA3LE OF THE BEES; OR, PRIVATE VicEs,
PUBUC BE=rs (Irwin Primer ed., 1962).
2See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
Op NAnONS, Book Four 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). But see GOLDMAN, supra note
27, at 143-44 (providing a skeptical response to the purported analogy between the
workings of the adversary system and the economic market's ivisible hand); Patricia L.
Rizzo, Morals For Home, Morals For Office: The Double Life of a Civil Litigator, 35
CATm. LAW. 79 (1991) (discussing the tension between professional ethics and personal
morals).
, See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 128 (1988)
(discussing duties "essential to the proper functioning of the role").
4 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 45, at 544; Paul L. Haines, Note, Restraining the
Overly Zealous Advocate: ]Tree For Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.L 445, 452 (1990).
,s See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAwYERL FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PR PESSION 153 (1993).
" See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 83, at 129 (staling justification of the role in terms
of contribution to the role's end); Michael 0. Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J. PHIL.
333, 348 (1994) (stating that it is still possible to step back from institutional moral norms
to assess their rational acceptability).
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authorized within the institution of cross-examination.' The main
concern, of course, is not with deciding whether or how much to blame
our cross-examiner, but with the moral status of the cross-examination
itself. It is important to bear in mind that the issue is not whether cross-
examination, broadly and in general, is a good or useful institution.
Instead, issues of the practical severability of immoral excesses arise.
Thus, even if attorney advocacy in general is morally justified,
zealous advocacy in particular or some extreme forms and degrees of
zealous advocacy may not be justifiedss Particular objectionable
practices may be readily severable from a broadly morally justifiable
institution. Excesses may be safely trimmed away.
The possibility of severability allows us to bypass any claim that
restricting abusive or deceptive cross-examination, however otherwise
desirable, would violate the U.S. Constitution. It is certainly possible to
argue that the Constitution, with its emphasis on the rights to due process,
a jury trial, compulsory process, and confrontation, implies something
suggestive of an adversary system.' It is, however, utterly implausible
to argue that any adversary system in which abusive or deceptive cross-
examinations were ethically barred would unconstitutionally abridge the
rights of litigants.
Defenders of current legal ethics codes might question the practical
assumptions underlying our proposed restrictions on abusive and
deceptive cross-examination. In particular, truth may be a distinctive
outcome of the adversary system, such as through vigorous cross-
examination.' The cross-examiner may not know all relevant truths
17 See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 89 (1980) ("[The lawyer, as well as the client, bears at least some responsibility
for banns done by both 'institutional' and 'personal' actions.").
so See Amy Gulmann, Can 'irtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759,
1763 (1993) ("[Zlealous advocacy does not justify certain tactics on behalf of one's clients
(such as discrediting a plaintiff by raising irrelevant facts about her sexual history).'.
Consider the possibility that the cross-examiner may wish to conduct an especially
abusive cross-examination of a rape victim within the rules and not necessarily at the
expense of the client's interest This course might be chosen, for example, if the cross-
examiner strategically wishes to establish a reputation within the legal.community that
will deter or intimidate future rape victims from complaining. For a discussion of this
broad strategic phenomenon in a different context, see Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532-
33 (1991).
' See, e.g., Jay S. Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial
Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 858-60 (1994); see also Haines, supra note 84, at 449
(discussing the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments).
' See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 45, at 1036-37; Monroe H. Freedman, Jhudge
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before or during the cross-examination process and may often be unsure
of the validity of the testimony she seeks to cross-examine.
Admittedly, the cross-examiner may be in a position only to speculate
with regard to relevant truth or falsity,9 in which case our critique of
the deception would be unfounded. Now, it may be possible for a cross-
examiner to plunge into an abyss of radical doubt and to invariably
profess uncertainty regarding some crucial fact. But this position is not
necessarily credible. Sometimes the lawyer will know relevant facts
securely enough.' The client may, for example, admit to the attorney
to having been at a given place at a given time. If so, it is hardly
reasonable to cross-examine a witness on that point while presuming that
the truth of the matter is obscure.
It might be argued that, in the context of this Article, the attorney's
knowledge of the truth is actually irrelevant. Perhaps the attorney should
not presume to know the truth, as that would be arrogating to oneself a
function assigned to the trier of law or fact.93 But this is, again, to
assume that in our context invoking the privileges and responsibilities of
one's institutional role bars any deeper moral challenge to one's ac-
tions.' An attorney's pretended ignorance must always be morally
justified. Even the established legal ethics codes in some circumstances
bar attorneys from professing ignorance or uncertainty when they in fact
know the truth. 95
What, though, of the argument that the attorney may know certain
information only because the client has confided in that attorney under a
promise of confidentiality and fiduciary loyalty? Surely attorneys should
not generally go about their business in ignorance of basic relevant
Frankel's Search For ruth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1060-61 (1975); Silver, supra note
89, at 883-85. For the view that truth in the context of adjudication is not discovered or
ascertained so much as created, performed, or practiced, see Milner S. Ball, Comment,
Wrong Experiment, Wrong Result: An Appreciatively Critical Response to Schwinz, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. L 565, 570.
9 For discussion, see Rhode, supra note 5, at 32; and Donald T. Weckstein,
Comment, The Civil Advocate and the Multifaceted Functions of Dispute Settlement -
Some Domestic and Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 577, 581
("[A] postevent inquiry is probably incapable of ever reconstructing the whole truth").
'z See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 6, at 14.
3 See id.; Schwartz, supra note 45, at 552.
See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFsSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (barrin& for
example, false statements of material fact by an attorney to a judge and evidence known
by the attorney to be false); id. Rule 3.4 (baning assistance to a witness testifying
falsely).
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facts." Clients, who may be the best or only source of such facts,
currently may rely in most cases upon the attorney's promise of undivided
loyalty. 7 For the lawyer to limit a cross-examination based upon
information disclosed in confidence by the client would thus betray the
client's trust and impair the workings of the adversary system. 8
These considerations are, however, ultimately not of great concern.
The existence of divided loyalties among professionals is neither
uncommon nor invariably unattractive. We do not expect surgeons to
broadly sacrifice the health interests of non-patients for those of patients,
or, for example, to fail to report a patient's gunshot wounds even at the
predictable expense of that patient's broader interests 9 Both physi-
cians1" and attorneys01 are expected under some specified circum-
stances to disclose patient or client statements made in confidence, even
contrary to the patient's or the client's expressed wishes or interests.
The obvious way to minimize the direct costs of betrayed client
confidences is for the attorney to specify in advance the limits of client
confidentiality. The client cannot claim disloyalty or betrayal if the
attorney has, in advance, explicitly held open the possibility of tailoring
any future cross-examination in light of all that has been disclosed to that
attorney.
Of course, such action might well lead to reduced client disclosures
to the attorney, and in turn to the attorney's litigating the case on the
basis of reduced information. But this unfortunate effect is not of
overwhelming significance. Plainly, some relevant information is withheld
from attorneys even with the current guarantees of relatively full
confidentiality. And it is still in the client's interest to disclose some
adverse information to the attorney even under a reduced scope of
See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 9, at 1473.
See id. at 1474-75; see also SISSELA BOy,, LYING: MoRAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIPE 160 (1978) (discussing the rationale in favor of client confidentiality);
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (discussing Freedman's argument on this point).
"See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 45, at 1056; see also GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at
110-11 (discussing cross-examination based on information gained in confidence).
"See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 4012 (1993).
10 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (holding
that a psychotherapist, believing the patient to be a threat, must take steps to warn third
parties, even if such belief was acquired through confidential communications).
l See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (barring an
attorney's knowing failure to disclose a material fact to the court when necessary to
prevent crime or fraud by the client).
[Vol 83
CROSS-EXAMuING LEGAL ETHICs
confidentiality. The issue, after all, is the possible scope or nature of
cross-examination, not the public disclosure of a client's private confes-
sion. Certainly, most limited or even foregone cross-examinations will not
strike the jury as amounting to a confession of guilt.
No doubt cases will arise in which a client will unfortunately
withhold information, perhaps on the false belief that such information is
prejudicial or is not otherwise vital for the attorney to know. Cases will
occur in which the opposing counsel will somehow become aware of the
undisclosed information in question. But it is far from clear why either
the Constitution or morality itself requires precisely the current kinds and
degrees of confidentiality. Why should the judicial system offer clients
precisely the current level of protection against the adverse consequences
of; for example, a client's wrong guess as to whether to conceal a
particular fact from his attorney? After all, correspondence between the
client's best interests in this respect and a broader public interest is not
necessary.
But the problem here is not simply one of balancing client and public
interests, although that is certainly how issues in legal ethics are often
envisioned. Consider, for example, the well-known thesis of Charles Fried
that "it is not only legally but morally right that a lawyer adopt as his
dominant purpose the furthering. of his client's interests - that it is right
that a professional put the interests of his client above some idea,
however valid, of the collective interest."'" If this inquiry becomes the
sole one, however, the attorney may be unduly tempted to romantically
exalt the individual, or the value of friendship with the client, above some
mere vague public interest.
However, as this Article's cross-examination hypotheticals make clear,
more than just generally diffused utility weighs against the current rules
of cross-examination. Even if the value of protecting human dignity or
autonomy counts generally in favor of some sort of adversary system,"
why do human dignity or autonomy and the specific moral rights of
witnesses or jurors not count against abusive or misleading cross-
examination?"°4 Acknowledging the possibility of a conflict between
clients' rights or interests and the rights of other individuals would
usefully open up the debate over legal ethical principles."5
10, Fried, supra note 1, at 1066.
',' See Frankel, supra note 45, at 1056-57 & n.68.S04 ee Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665,
671 (1994); see also ,Haines, supra note 84, at 451 (discussing, without endorsing, the
adversary system and its emphasis on client autonomy).... While no consensus might emerge on the precise boundary between rights of
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The possibility that witnesses and other persons might hold rights in
conflict with the rights or interests of the clients might not amount to
much if witnesses could fairly be said to typically waive such rights, as
by consenting voluntarily to testify under certain knowable ground rules.
Just as we might be said to democratically consent to an adversary system
through our elected representatives,"°s so witnesses, including rape
victims, might be said to consent to what predictably lies in store on the
witness -stand. 7
An argument can be made that jurors actually, if tacitly or impliedly,
consent to being misled by attorneys, at least for the sake of some
presumed greater truth. After all, an attorney may know relevant facts a
jury cannot, or so at least a jury might believe. It is even possible that
some witnesses might consent to being cross-examined in a deliberately
misleading way, at least for the sake of some greater truth known,
securely, by the cross-examiner.
However, it is patently unreasonable to suppose that typical rape
victims consent to what this Article has called abusive cross-examination.
Presumably, a rape victim testifies out of a sense of painful and important
obligation or to reduce the chances of serious crimes being perpetrated
against others. The result of not testifying and thus not being subjected
to abusive cross-examination would be failing to discharge that important
obligation or enhancing the risk of future serious crimes against others.
It is presumably impossible to negotiate for a more civilized cross-
examination or to fulfill the purposes in testifying through some less
distasteful third option.
Even if the rape victim witness thinks of testifying as a civic right or
privilege, an analysis in terms of consent cannot justify otherwise morally
objectionable cross-examination. For purposes of illustration, it may be
said that while some sort of cross-examination is an inherent, inseparable
part of testifying, abusive cross-examination is, in effect, a special cost
or tax authoritatively imposed upon some or all persons who choose to
testify. And in the analogous context of voting, one would ordinarily be
quite suspicious of special taxes imposed upon some or all of those who
seek to vote, especially if such a special tax or cost were predictably
disproportionately burdensome to identifiable groups of persons otherwise
qualified to vote.'
clients and witnesses, considerations of character would further such discussions."' See DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at 108 (discussing, without
endorsing, such a view).
7 For general discussion in a significantly different context, see Richards, supra note
67, at 387." See generally Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966)
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Undoubtedly, differences between voting and testifying in court as a
rape victim exist."° The important point is that nobody would claim
that persons who vote after paying a tax have lost the right to morally or
legally object because they have "consented" to that tax. The legal system
may choose to expand the idea of consent so as to conclude that rape
victim witnesses somehow consent to any question permitted by statute,
court rule, or relevant legal ethics codes. But such would merely settle the
issue by fiat One would want to know why this expansion of the idea of
consent is morally, and not just legally, legitimate. And one would then
note the disturbing possibility of a loose parallel between the legal
system's finding implied consent in such cases and the many arguments
propounded by rape defendants themselves in favor of finding consent in
the underlying rape case.
At this point, it may fairly be concluded that our familiar adversary
system, even as tempered by relevant rules of professional responsibility,
tends in important situations to require or encourage what would often be
thought of as morally unjustified conduct. But the rules of legal ethics
commonly refer beyond the text of the rules themselves, to the judgments
of one's peers as attorneys and to personal conscience, as guides."0
Does this openness dissolve the moral problem? Plainly it does not.
The rules of legal ethics do not guarantee a satisfactory accommoda-
tion of the promptings of an enlightened conscience."' No broad
conscience-based defense to violations of legal ethical rules exists.
Accommodation of one's conscience might well take the form of
gradually, unconsciously tailoring one's own conscience to fit the
judgments of peers or the pragmatic demands of one's circumstances. The
rules do not generally exalt attorney conscience over the interests or
demands of the client." In any event, violation of one's personal
(striking down a fee or tax imposed prior to voting).
" For example, a payer of poll taxes ordinarily knows in advance the precise scope
of the tax; however, with the rape victim, the degree of abuse the wiless may be called
upon to endure may vary widely, and the likely nature and degree of abuse may be utterly
unknown to the prospective witness, thus undermining claims of consent. See RSTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 892A (1977) (discussing limitations on the scope of consent
in a tort defense context).
10 See MODEL RULES OF ftomssioxAL CoNDucT Preamble ("[A] lawyer is also
guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers.). The preamble
concludes, or supposes, that "when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can
be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is
being done." Id.
". See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IowA L. REv.
975, 975 (1990)." See, e.g., E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical &andard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L.
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conscience should not be the fundamental moral issue. Conscience can be
fallible. We must be concerned about attorney conduct that may be
morally defective, even though it is in accord with the attorney's
conscience and with the collective conscience of professional peers.
V. INTENTIONS, OUTCOMES, AND THE MEDIATION OF CHARACTER
It is reasonable to call contemporary legal ethical principles into
serious moral question in important contexts. This task has been
undertaken, however, without fully addressing an underlying problem that
has no easy solution. The general problem can be stated in a legal context
as follows: often, it will seem morally right to follow a familiar, broad
moral rule and refrain from engaging in even legally permissible abuse
or deception on cross-examination, if the good consequences obtainable
from such are small. If the payoff for violating a presumed broad moral
rule while still acting within the rules of legal ethics is modest in terms
of good outcomes, it may be concluded that, all things considered, it is
morally wrong to push the legal ethics code toward its limits by engaging
in conduct normally barred by the general, broad moral rules.
This loosely parallels the ordinary moral judgment that one should
not lie, steal, or break a promise in order to obtain some small net
increase in overall utility."3 But what if the promised gain in utility is
not small? What if, hypothetically, lying, stealing, or breaking a promise
were clearly necessary to produce, with certainty, an enormously better
balance of good over evil or to avoid some catastrophe? In the legal
context, what if acts of at least minimally abusive or deceptive cross-
examination were known, on some occasions, to be necessary to avoid an
unjust conviction or to sustain an adjudicatory system that promises the
least injustice, overall, to criminal defendants, witnesses, and the victims
of crime? In such cases, many of us might be inclined to judge some
intentional acts minimally violative of familiar moral rules to be morally
permissible, at least subject to some sort of fairness constraints.
Our inclinations would thus be in some tension, depending upon the
nature or magnitude of the payoff from limited violations of familiar
moral rules. Of course, problems of certainty and of burden of proof may
loom large, but such problems cannot undermine this disturbing problem
in principle: at what precise point do the consequences of following a
REv. 575, 595 (1961).
113 See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Utilitarianism and the Virtues, in CONSEQUENTLAISM AND
ITs CRITICS, supra note 47, at 236, 238.
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basic moral rule, such as not intentionally abusing or deceiving persons,
become so unattractive that one is morally permitted, even if not required,
to engage in that abuse or deception in violation of the general rule?
Of course, no such precise point can be clearly established. Nor is
there available any convincing theory of just how moral decisionmaking
should make the apparent transition from avoiding intentional injuries to
accepting intentional injuries for the sake of avoiding dramatically bad
consequences or of obtaining good consequences. Initially, we are not
interested in the minimally good results flowing from intentional wrongs,
but later, when the nature of the payoff changes, then mysteriously, as
through some gestalt shift we take seriously the possible good conse-
quences. One moral decisionmaking paradigm has somehow begun to
pick up where another, apparently incommensurable paradigm has
inexplicably left off.
This Article cannot genuinely answer the question of precisely where,
if at all, it might become morally permissible for an attorney to intention-
ally abuse or mislead. But it is possible to bring the apparently incom-
mensurable realms of avoiding intentional harm and of producing good
outcomes into some sort of integrated relationship. This result can be
achieved by assigning a mediating role to the ideas of character, virtue,
and vice.
It should be specified that the idea of virtue and vice in this sense is
not meant to enthrone some politically biased view of morally sound
behavior. The idea of virtue and vice does not itself tell us what sorts of
things really are virtuous and vicious. What any particular culture
historically thought of as virtue or vice may not be similarly viewed
today. Moreover, reference to character by itself does not imply much
about who can fairly be held responsible for what or about whether some
or all persons control their own moral circumstances.' 4 Not all social
problems can be fairly resolved by enjoining the sufferers to strengthen
their character.
While the idea of character can be abused, it has not been established
that the ideas of character, virtue, and vice are unavoidably too ideologi-
cally loaded, inherently authoritarian, intrusive, repressive, or otherwise
dangerous to be used for any purpose. Consider the possibility of
admiring genuine courage on the part of one with whom one disagrees.
1 See generally it George Wight, The Progressive Logic of Crminal Responsibility
and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 463 (1994)
(discussing those who have most been deprived of the "requisites of moral responsibili-
ty').
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Character has, for much of our history, been important to ethical thought
of various sorts,"5 and it may well have a role to play in our context.
Interestingly, codes of legal ethics have of late tended to reduce their
emphasis on considerations of character."6 This approach may reflect
broader cultural trends, as well as a decreasing homogeneity in bar
membership - character, virtue, and vice could thus no longer be equated
with the conceptions of dominant social groups. But it is really not clear
how changing bar demographics can explain a shift in emphasis from
character to rules. Of course, different groups will bring different
understandings of character, but why would they not also, or especially,
bring different understandings of what rules are morally sound? If rules
are more determinate and precise than considerations of character, then
why would decreased bar homogeneity not lead to less agreement on
determinate rules, as opposed to notions of character which might
encompass, or disguise the presence ot many contrasting views? Why
could a broader societal consensus not occur on courage or integrity and
their value than regarding the rules about disclosure of a client's intended
crimes?
A possible explanation is that lawyers find rules easier to apply and
casually assume that if conceptions of character vary, -the idea of
character is officially useless. Perhaps unbending, minimum rules are
thought more necessary in light of decreasing bar homogeneity. The bar
thus emphasizes rules instead of character. But even if rules are easier to
fairly enforce with due process than are considerations of character, costs
associated with underplaying considerations of character are still incurred.
Consider the abusive cross-examination of a rape victim which the
current rules of professional ethics permit. One might say that this
conduct is nonetheless wrong because it violates some broader moral rule,
as elaborated by Kant or the principle of double effect... But the same
conduct can be morally criticized without reference to any moril rule. It
might, literally, be referred to as a "vicious" cross-examination. If pressed
to elaborate, one might also refer to the cross-examination as "ruthless."
115 See, e.g., JuDrni N. SHKLAIt, ORDINARY VIcES 232 (1984) (referring to the ethics
of character developed by Aristotle and Kant). For development of a largely Aristotelian
ethics of character, see THoMAs AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTuES (John A. Oesterle
tras. & Univ. of Notre Dame Press ed., 1984). See generally KRONMAN, supra note 85;
MICHAEL SLOTE, FROM MORAi/rn TO VIRTuu (1992).
116 See MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 79 (1994); see also
KRONMAN, smra note 85; Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEAL
ETHIcS 219, 266 (1995) (discussing KRONMAN, supra note 85).
117 See supra notes 36-80 and accompanying text.
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More formally, it might be thought that the cross-examination offers some
evidence of the vicious character trait of ruthlessness." 8
By this, it is not precisely meant that the cross-examiner has violated
some moral rule or has failed to promote some good result or avoid some
bad result. Rather, it might be, in this respect that the cross-examiner's
moral character is being evaluated.
Evaluation of the cross-examiner's moral character is important
because one may, when making moral decisions, sometimes wish to
modify even the most deeply felt moral rules in light of what is thought
to be virtuous or vicious."9 Following a generally sound moral rule
may promote or require, on some occasions, vicious behavior. On the
other hand, one need not think that someone who always maximizes the
balance of good over bad and is willing to violate moral rules in order to
do so is necessarily a good person. One would also want to know why
that person chooses to produce such results; perhaps that person is
selfishly motivated. How a person is morally evaluated may reflect her
virtues and vices as much as the good or bad results she may have, for
whatever reasons, sought.2 Thus, neither following moral rules nor
producing good outcomes exhausts the idea of virtue.
The ideas of virtue and character cannot beautifully unify moral rule-
following and produced good outcomes into a homogeneous, seamless
web. But they can offer some sort of integrating moral framework.
Considerations of character can suggest a reason for being morally
dissatisfied, for example, with an attorney who engages in legally
permitted abuse or deception for some modest net gain. Such tactics may
reflect bad character, but considerations of character may not always
reinforce moral rule-following. For example, an attorney who habitually
refuses to engage in a legally permitted act of minimal deception, even
where that would be necessary to avoid a great injustice, either in the
case at hand or more generally, may appear in some respects to be a
person of questionable moral character. Devotion to principle is fine, but
such a person may also seem uncaring, overly fastidious, unsympathetic,
cold-hearted, or even self-indulgent. At the very least, such decisions may
seem less than virtuous. Thus, attorneys might be of questionable moral
character even if they do not narrowly intend any harm but only foresee
n' For philosophical reference to ruthlessness as a moral vice, see, e.g., Gregory
Mellema, Offence and Frtue Ethics, 21 CAN. I. PHIL. 323, 327 (1991).
119 See Gregory E. Pence, Recent Work On Virtues, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 281, 290 (1984).
n See Robert Amdi, Volition, Intention, and Responsibility, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1675,
1703 (1994); Phillip Montague, Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story, 29 AM. PHIL.
Q. 53, 55 (1992).
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such ensuing harm." This assessment is especially clear in any case
in which an attorney ghoulishly welcomes, without actually "intending,"
those foreseen harms.
Attention to character thus may help us reconcile, in some fashion,
the competing pulls of moral rule-following and attention to good and
bad outcomes. It is unfortunate that codes of legal ethics have recently
downplayed such concerns, especially since the practice of litigation itself
may well affect professional character. Even as adults and professionals,
we gradually acquire virtues and vices through observation,' habit;
and repeated practice." Litigators, beginning in law school, presumably
observe and engage in the questioning of witnesses and, over time, form
habits of cross-examination. Once formed, habits, whether virtuous or
vicious, take on a certain motivational power of their own." Current
rules of legal ethics thus underemphasize the significance of virtue at
their own peril to the detriment ofparticipants in the adjudicative process.
VL CoNcLusIoN: QUESTIONABLE ADVERSARIAL
TACTICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
This Article's cross-examination of legal ethics should be concluded
by considering a final dimension of the problem. It is commonly and
plausibly assumed that the adversary system of litigation works best with
opposing parties of roughly equal capabilities and resources.' Obvi-
121 This point is fully compatible with recognizing that we judge character by
intentions, as opposed to unintended consequences. See PHIaaPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 4 (1978).
"2 See, e.g., Jean Baechler, Firtue: Its Nature, Exigency, and Acquisition, in 34
NoMos: VIRTUE 25, 48 (John W. Chapman trans., John W. Chapman & William A.
Galston eds., 1992).
'n See AQUINAS, supra note 115, at 27 ("[Al habit of virtue cannot be caused by one
act, but only by many.'); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book Two 55-56; id., Book
Five, at 141 (JA.K. Thomson trans., Penguin ed., 1953); R. Jay Wallace, Virtue, Reason,
and Principle, 21 CAN. J. PHIL. 469, 475 (1991).
124 See RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORAInY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 311 (1992);
see also id. at 289 (describing virtues as more or less fixed dispositions "to desire an
action of a certain sort'.
12 See, e.g., Judith Resnick, The Declining Faith in the Adversary System, 13
LITIGATION 3, 4 (1986); Rhode, supra note 27, at 598; see also LUBAN, supra note 83,
at 60 (describing zealous advocacy by criminal defense counsel, as opposed to criminal
prosecution, as a mechanism to restrain or handicap the state for the sake of civil
liberties); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 354-55 (1988) (stating that adversarialism requires "that the strongest
arguments for and against proposed social change be made").
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ously, this condition is not always met. Cases occur in which a primary
point of the litigation is to promote social change, sometimes on behalf
of precisely those persons not in a position to litigate as equals to their
adversaries. Professional ethics codes do not generally address what
differences, if any, litigating on behalf of such social change is thought
to make. Can different styles of cross-examination, including abuse and
deception, perhaps be justified for the sake of social change?
As this Article's discussion of character suggests, one cannot rule out
the legitimacy of abuse or deception if necessary to achieve a sufficiently
worthwhile social goal. In such a case, it might be morally defensible to
litigate not only up to the officially sanctioned limits, but beyond those
limits as well No guarantee exists that lawyers, as a relatively well-off
segment of society, will ensure that the rules of legal ethics optimally
promote the interests of those who are poor. In such cases, it must always
be questioned whether the anticipated payoff of enhanced social justice
is indeed likely, and whether any degree of abuse or deception is
necessary to achieve that payoff.
It is important to bear in mind that whatever their overall value, many
famili moral rules, such as those generally prohibiting lying, theft, and
assault, may not be socially or economically class-neutral in their effects.
For example, even a rule barring medical transplants without the consent
of the donor predictably benefits some groups more than others. 6
Moreover, something is vaguely suspect about touting increased limits on
adversarial excesses just when some less fortunate groups are beginning
to effectively litigate their claims.127 If rich and.poor do not address
each other in an open, unconstrained, unbiased manner through the legal
system,' abuse or deception might tend to offset systemic biases
against the poor. Morally questionable litigation tactics might at least
provide a benefit in terms of increased publicity for the client or cause,
which may be important at certain historical stages.
The use of such tactics, however, is a risky business at best. Societal
reform through litigation is generally difficult."2 It may well be that
"' See SCHEFFLE supra note 56, at 113 (comparing the effect on society as a whole
with the effect on individual groups).
' See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 125 (discussing the vulnerability of those with
either inadequate or no representation).
' See, e.g., Paul Brest, Fuwher Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical
Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1623, 1627 (1988); see also Jurgen Habermas, Discourse
Ethics: Notes On a Program of Philosophical Justificaion, in THE CoMMUNICAtivE
ETmCS CONTROVERSY 60, 62 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr eds., 1990) (arguing that
judgments should be made in an unconstrained impartial environment).
w See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS:
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adversarial tactics even vaguely associated with abuse or deception more
commonly retard rather than promote litigation-induced social change.
This is probably true regardless of how powerful the targets of
one's abuse or deception may be. It will not normally be the case that
publicity can be maximized only through abusive or deceptive cross-
examination by attorneys. Social change may be more broadly accepted
if its judicial proponents are perceived as striving for fairness, openness,insight, and judgment, ' rather than as experimenting with the moral
limits of abuse, deception, and other forms of dubious adversarialism.
SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LIMIS OF LEGAL IMAGINAnON (1994); GERAnD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTs BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
130 See LUBAN, sVra note 83, at 109.
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